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Abstract 
At the heart of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are substantial trade preferences 
which, coupled with the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), grant a wide range of goods 
produced in qualified African countries duty-free access to USA. To be AGOA-eligible, countries 
are assessed annually on their progress in undertaking appropriate economic, institutional and 
human rights reforms. Our paper seeks to cover new grounds by exploring whether exports of 
apparel to US crowds out EU-15’s imports from Africa over the period 2001-2016. Two-stage least 
squares estimates of our gravity model provide no evidence of trade displacement but, instead, 
provide support for the hypothesis of complementarity of African exports to the two key markets. A 
stronger positive impact of bilateral trade between US and Africa on EU-African trade is evident 
mainly before the phasing out of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. We examine whether the 
more relaxed special waiver embodied in AGOA’s apparel provision cause Non-Knitted exports to 
EU-15 to be crowded out.  We find that Special Rule beneficiaries' exports to the two markets still 
complement each other, but for every percentage increase in exports to USA, there is a less than 
proportionate increase in exports to EU-15, indicating a higher utilisation of the special waiver. 
We also find some evidence of complementary apparel exports to both LDCs (least developing 
countries) and non-LDCs, with stronger effects for non-LCDs and in non-knitted sector.  
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1. Introduction 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was introduced by the United States 
in the year 2000 with the objectives of expanding and deepening trade and investment 
relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), encouraging economic growth and 
development and facilitating the continent’s integration into the global economy. At the 
heart of AGOA are substantial trade preferences, which coupled with the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP), grant a wide range of goods produced in qualified countries 
duty-free access to the US. To be AGOA-eligible, countries are assessed on an annual basis 
on their progress in meeting a set of specific criteria including establishment of market-
based economy and rule of law, strengthening of the private sector, reforms to alleviate 
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poverty and combat corruption, better access to health services and education recognition 
of core labour standards and elimination of barriers to US trade and investment.  
 
Most of these eligibility requirements encourage SSA countries to undertake 
appropriate economic, institutional and human rights reforms that in turn reduce behind-
the-border barriers to trade. The need for enhanced behind-the-border trade facilitating and 
growth enhancing amenities, such as improved ‘hard infrastructure’ (highways, railways, 
ports, etc) and ‘soft infrastructure’ (better institutions, higher transparency, more 
competition, stronger governance, etc) as a means to facilitate economic growth and 
development is well documented in literature (see for example, Limão and Venables, 1999; 
Francois and Manchin, 2006; Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2008; Iwanow and Kirkpatrick, 
2009).  
 
The apparel sector has been identified as one of the three non-crude petroleum sectors 
benefitting most from the legislation, along with transportation equipment and refined 
petroleum products (USITC, 2014).  In first three years since AGOA’s inception, the value 
of US imports of apparel rose sharply but later dropped to a lower level. Over the 2001-
2016 period, however, the value of US apparel imports remained higher than EU-15’s 
imports from the same group of countries. The extent of preferential access, measured by 
the average most-favoured-nation tariff, to the US market under AGOA does not differ 
greatly from that granted by the EU’s preferential regimes under the Cotonou agreement 
and EBA, but there is a significant divergence on rules of origin (Portugal-Perez, 2008). 
While the EU’s rules require a double transformation process in which yarn should be 
woven into fabric in the beneficiary country or in a country qualifying for cumulation under 
EU schemes and then made up into apparel in the beneficiary country, AGOA’s Special 
Rule allows lesser developed countries to use fabric originating from anywhere in the 
world, hence allowing these countries to take advantage of cheaper sources. 
 
While the impacts of AGOA on US imports from Sub-Saharan Africa have received a 
lot of attention in the literature, few studies have examined whether an increase in African 
exports to the US affects similar exports to other key markets such as EU-15 offering 
similar preferences. This paper adds to the discussion of trade redirection from EU-15 to 
US due to AGOA. We re-examine Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) proposition that 
the increased apparel exports to the US under AGOA could be a result of redirection of 
exports from other markets using data over a much longer span of 2001-2016 (as opposed 
  3 
to 1999-2000 and 2002-2003) in a gravity model setting. We also investigate whether the 
impact differs before and after the phasing out of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing 
(ATC) as well as in the knitted and non-knitted sub-sectors.  One could argue that as AGOA 
apparel exporters face stiffer competition from more efficient Asian exporters, they would 
further utilise preferences granted by AGOA and concentrate on the US market, leading to 
displacement of exports to the EU. Moreover, given that there are substantial differences 
in the apparel rules of origin, we hypothesize that African countries may prefer to export 
to the US at the expense of EU as AGOA offers more relaxed rules of origins (RoOs), 
especially in the non-knitted sector.  
 
The displacement or complementary effect uncovered by the analysis would yield 
interesting insights on the success of the clothing provision of the Act. If bilateral trade 
from Africa is redirected from EU-15 to US, this would imply that African apparel 
exporters find AGOA’s market access provisions, including its more relaxed rules of 
origins, to be more beneficial. This would provide the much anticipated support and 
credibility to the clothing program, seen as a centrepiece of the legislation at the time of 
implementation. AGOA intentionally targeted the highly labour-intensive apparel sector 
for special benefits with a view to not only foster employment creation opportunities in all 
beneficiary countries, but also to give Africa another chance to lift its apparel exports to 
threshold productivity levels and carve a niche amidst an increasingly competitive global 
trading environment. Apparel production is considered as a manufacturing sector with low 
technological and investment barriers to entry, requiring relatively low skilled labour 
forces, hence relevant to many African nations (Williams, 2015). 
 
On the other hand, if there is complementarity between EU-15 and US apparel imports, 
this would imply that African exporters still see EU-15 as a natural market and that AGOA 
preferences were not being fully utilised by all beneficiaries to cause an offsetting effect, 
thus undermining one of the key intentions of the act. From the US importers’ perspective, 
tariff margins offered by AGOA would not provide enough incentives to influence apparel 
sourcing decisions away from more competitive suppliers from around the world. 
International competitiveness requires, among other things, modern business practices, 
good infrastructure and trade logistics. Earlier studies have linked poor export performance 
in the region to inadequate infrastructure (Limão and Venables, 2001), low levels of per 
capita income, small country size, geography (Rodrik, 1998), domestic trade policies 
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(Wang and Winters, 1998) and transport costs and other natural barriers (Morrissey, 2005). 
These could still represent major impediments to trade in many African nations. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a descriptive overview of US and 
EU preferential trading schemes with Africa. Section 3 then reviews the literature. Model 
specification and data sources are outlined in Section 4. Estimation results and discussion 
are provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. US and EU Trading Arrangements with Africa 
2.1. US-Africa Trade Relation 
The centrepiece of US trade policy for Africa is the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA), a non-reciprocal trade agreement signed on May 18, 2000 by US Congress. 
Initially designed to cover an 8-year period, the program was extended to 2015 in the 
AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004 (AGOA III).  On June 29, 2015, the Trade Preferences 
Extension Act renewed the program for a further 10 years. The legislation also includes a 
mandate for US and African government officials to meet and discuss economic issues 
including US development assistance to Africa through the AGOA forum. 
 
AGOA eligibility is not an automatic process. Country eligibility is reviewed annually 
by the US President, who grants beneficiary status to an African nation if it is committed 
to: developing market-based economies; political and legal institutions; removing barriers 
to US trade and investment; improving intellectual property rights; fighting corruption; 
reducing poverty; protecting human and worker rights, and eradicating child labour 
(AGOA 2000).  
 
AGOA allows eligible African nations to export non-apparel and apparel products to 
the US without incurring a tariff charge. It expands the US Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) list of approximately 4,600 non-apparel products (such as watches, 
footwear, handbags, luggage and work gloves to name a few) adding 1,800 other items; 
representing additional markets to which only AGOA-eligible countries have access. 
African countries must be eligible for GSP to become AGOA beneficiaries. As a result, 
AGOA countries can export about 6,400 items without duty restrictions to the United 
States.  
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Apparel articles, generally excluded from the US GSP1, are exempt from US import 
tariff under AGOA. This trade preference is, however, not automatic as soon as AGOA 
eligibility is granted. To qualify for the Apparel provision, countries must have in place (i) 
an effective apparel visa system to prevent illegal shipment and use of counterfeit 
documentation and (ii) appropriate enforcement and verification procedures. The 
provision’s product specific rules of origin (PSRO)2 were designed in line with the triple-
transformation process (cotton to yarn to textile to apparel) prevailing under other US trade 
concessions programmes such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (Portugal-Perez, 2008).  Apparel has to be assembled in 
one or more AGOA eligible country from US fabrics (or African-country fabrics up to a 
specified percentage), which in turn were made from US yarn3. Apparels made in AGOA 
eligible countries from US fabric and yarn have duty-free and quota-free access to the US 
market without limitations. Apparels made with domestically produced fabric or that 
produced in other AGOA beneficiary countries also qualify for concessionary treatment 
but are subject to a quantitative restriction4.  
 
The Apparel provision also embodies a ‘Special Rule’ (or ‘third country fabric rule of 
origin’) designed for least developed AGOA beneficiaries. AGOA designates least 
developing countries (LDCs) as countries with a GNP per capita below $1,500 in 1998 as 
defined by the World Bank (ITA, 2019). It is interesting to note that there is greater latitude 
in determining LDC status under the US GSP scheme than under AGOA (Williams, 2015 
p.6). While GSP defines LDCs as per to the United Nations’ designation based on three 
criteria5 namely, Gross National Income per capita of $1,025, Human Assets Index of 60 
(lower index indicates lower human capital) and Economic Vulnerability Index of 36 
                                                
1 The US GSP allows duty free access to some handicraft items certified for being hand-loomed and of folklore 
nature under the ‘Certified Textile Handicraft Agreements’ signed by the United States and fifteen beneficiary countries 
(United States Trade Representative, These items are not part of the HS61 (knitted apparel) and HS 62 (non-knitted 
apparel) considered in this paper 
2 These elaborate sets of rules, designed primarily to prevent trade deflection, apply in a “non-homogeneous” 
manner across product categories. Rules of origins are guidelines for establishing the origin or ‘economic nationality’ 
of the goods and not just the country they have been shipped from but also the place where they are deemed to have 
been produced. This ensures that concessionary access given to a particular market benefits the intended recipient and 
not third parties. 
3 Under the “De Minimis Rule”, apparel containing fibres or yarns not wholly formed in the US or other AGOA 
beneficiaries retain duty free benefits provided the weight of such inputs do not exceed 10% of the total weight 
(AGOA, https://agoa.info).  
4 AGOA restricts imports of apparel made with regional fabric to a fixed percentage of the aggregate square meter 
equivalents of all apparel articles imported into the US. Starting October 1, 2007, the annual aggregate quantity of 
imports under these provisions was an amount not to exceed 7% of all apparel imported into the US. Any excess 
imports over this amount are subject to applicable tariffs. In addition, the duty-free cap is not allocated among countries 
but works on a “first come, first serve” principle (OTEXA, 2017). Moreover, the value of any foreign-sourced 
interlinings, findings and trimmings should not exceed 25 per cent of the cost of the components of the assembled 
apparel article. 
5 See U.N Economic Analysis & Policy Division, LDC Identification Criteria and Indicators 
(https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-criteria.html) 
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(higher index indicates higher vulnerability), US officials are also authorised to assess 
compliance with GSP statutory requirements and comments from the public (CRS Report, 
2019).  
 
The Special Rule relaxes the apparel provision’s rules of origin by allowing the least 
developed AGOA beneficiaries to manufacture with fabrics and yarns originating from 
anywhere in the world without incurring a tariff charge. In effect, this special provision 
allows for a single transformation requirement (fabric to apparel) instead of the more 
rigorous triple transformation. Despite having a level of GNP per capita exceeding the 
threshold of $1,500 GNP per capita, Botswana, Namibia and Mauritius have been granted 
LDC status. South Africa is the only country that does not qualify for the special waiver. 
Since its inception in 2001, the Special Rule has been renewed four times6 and remains in 
effect until September 2025. 
 
2.2 EU-Africa Preferential Trading Schemes 
Since 1975, African countries have enjoyed unilateral preferential access to the EU 
market under Lomé Convention and its successive rounds. Deemed as a breach of the WTO 
‘most-favoured nation’ principle, the convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement 
in 2000. This marked the beginning of a reciprocal but asymmetric market access, where 
the EU provides full duty free market access to ACP countries that ratify Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the latter commit to progressively open their markets 
to EU. To assist the integration of least developed countries into the global economy, EU 
launched the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiative in 2001 as an extension of its GSP 
scheme to meet the needs of least developed countries worldwide and granted full duty free 
and quota-free access to the EU for all their exports with the exception of arms and 
armaments. 
 
Product specific rules of origin (PSRO) for textile and apparel under EBA and Cotonou 
agreement follow those postulated by EU’s “single list” (Portugal-Perez, 2008). The 
“Single List”, implemented since July 2000, harmonised rules of origin under various 
trading agreements, and extended the double transformation process to all apparel lines 
under chapter 61 and 62 of the Harmonised system.  For textile and apparel, the rules of 
                                                
6 The special rule was extended in 2004 for three years, in 2007 for another five years, in 2012 for a further three 
years and in 2015 for ten years. A list of AGOA beneficiaries and countries eligible for the Apparel Provision and 
Special Rule can be found on the International Trade Administration (ITA), US Department of Commerce website 
(https://www.trade.gov/agoa/eligibility/index.asp).   
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origin required that apparel be manufactured from yarn wholly produced in the exporter 
country. Production from yarn entails a double transformation process in the beneficiary 
country, with the yarn being woven into fabric and fabric cut and made into clothing (yarn 
to fabric to apparel). The EBA initiative imposes a further burden on African countries in 
that the cumulation provision is ‘bilateral’7 (EU and beneficiary country). In other words, 
fabrics cannot be sourced from countries in the region to manufacture clothing and only 
fabrics made in the exporting country or the EU are acceptable. Cotonou agreement allows 
full cumulation among African countries so that regional fabrics can be used without 
compromising origin requirements. It also attached extensive conditions to potential 
cumulation with non-ACP countries, including South Africa.  
 
2.3 AGOA Countries’ Apparel Exports to US and EU-15 
US total imports under AGOA are heavily concentrated in crude petroleum, which 
account for a share of roughly 90%. Imports other than crude petroleum include agriculture, 
manufactured goods (including electronics, machinery, transportation equipment, 
chemicals and miscellaneous manufacturing), natural resources (non-crude petroleum 
energy, minerals and metals) and textiles and apparels (USITC, 2014). Apparel was the 
main non-petroleum product category imported under AGOA in the early years of the 
program, but has since faltered in rank and value.  
 
 
 
                                                
7 With bilateral cumulation, parties can use intermediate goods from each other without losing origin status. 
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As shown in Figure 1, exports in this category increased sharply in the first three 
years of AGOA’s launch, growing by 70% on average. Since 2005, which also marks the 
termination of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, US imports of apparel from the 
region dwindled, posting an average growth of -3.4% to 2016. The value of EU-15 apparel 
imports from the same group countries, on the other hand, stayed relatively flat until 2008, 
declined during the recession and picked up again in 2013.  A similar pattern is observed 
with US imports post 2008. Overall, however, the value of US imports of apparel remained 
higher than EU-15 imports since AGOA’s inception. 
A more disaggregated view of the apparel sector shows that US imports of knitted 
and non-knitted apparel articles from Africa bear a very close resemblance (Figure 2). This 
contrasts remarkably with EU-15, which appears to source more Knitted apparel (CH61) 
from Africa than Non-Knitted items. 
 
3. Literature review 
 EU’s non-reciprocal trade preferences not only aim at boosting export volumes for 
developing countries but also facilitating export diversification. Gjodesen-Lund and 
Van Biesebroeck (2015) note that EU’s GSP preferences and EBA program have strong 
positive impacts on developing countries’ exports, especially LDCs.  Similarly, Cirera et. 
al. (2016) observe that unilateral preferences have been successful at boosting exports to 
the EU through both lower tariffs and positive preference margin.  However, views on 
export diversification are less promising when African countries are considered. Persson 
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and Wilhelmsson (2016) for instance observe that although EU GSP increased the ranges 
of export products for developing countries, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
preferences granted during 1989–2007 (Lomé IV-Cotonou) may have caused more 
specialization than diversification. In fact, the proportion of manufactured goods exported 
by African LDCs to their main partners, including the EU, is marginal and showed no 
improvement over 2000–12. Fuels and to a lesser extent ores and metals, made up most of 
these exports. 
 
Considering that the intent of AGOA is to enhance Africa’s integration into the global 
economy by encouraging trade and investment, generate employment and increase 
productivity and per capita income growth, its impact on beneficiaries’ exports to the US 
has generated a lot interest among researchers. To this end, various approaches have been 
used including computable general equilibrium models (Bouët et al., 2010), partial 
equilibrium models (Mattoo et al., 2003; Shapouri and Trueblood, 2003; Laborde, 2008), 
analysis of raw trade data and AGOA provisions (Shapouri and Trueblood, 2003; Brenton 
and Ikezuki, 2004; Brenton and Hoppe, 2006; Office of US Trade Representative, 2008), 
country case studies (Lall, 2005; Rolfe and Woodward, 2005; Phelps et al., 2009), gravity 
model (Nouve and Staatz, 2003; Nouve, 2005; Seyoum, 2007; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008; 
Mueller, 2008; Didia et al., 2015), regression models (Collier and Venables, 2007; Cook 
and Jones, 2015) and triple difference-in-differences models (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 
2010; Fernandes et.al., 2019)8.  
 
Studies drawing on raw trade data on SSA exports to the US (Shapouri and Trueblood, 
2003; Brenton and Ikezuki, 2004; Brenton and Hoppe, 2006; Office of US Trade 
Representative, 2008) find evidence of significant and increasing exports under AGOA. 
There was a general consensus that most of the rise in exports were concentrated in 
petroleum and apparel sectors as well as a small number of countries. Similarly, Yatrakis 
(2002) claimed that $1 billion of trade was created within its first year, accounting for 17% 
of total SSA exports to the US. However, this was very much limited to five countries, with 
South Africa responsible for two thirds of exports via AGOA.  Given that South Africa is 
the largest and most developed in the region, which implies fewer internal constraints 
compared to other beneficiaries, Yatrakis explains that it is not surprising to find South 
Africa instantly benefitting from AGOA.  
 
                                                
8 See Condon and Stern (2011) for an interesting review of these studies. 
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Other studies use longitudinal data and gravity model to assess the extent to which 
AGOA explained the increase in exports to the US. Although Seyoum (2007) finds no 
significant effect of AGOA on beneficiaries’ overall exports to the US over 2000-2004 
period, his analysis of energy, minerals and apparel sectors shows that AGOA-induced 
statistically significant gains only in the case of apparel exports. Mueller (2008) however 
finds no such positive contribution even on apparel exports. Nilsson (2007) and Di Rubbo 
and Canali (2008) did not find significant trade-creating effects for AGOA. Those two 
studies, however, employed differing levels of aggregation and focussed on different 
product groups. Nilsson (2007) explored the effects on total exports while Di Rubbo and 
Canali (2008) focused on agri-products. The ineffectiveness of AGOA in promoting 
agricultural trade is also observed by Nouve and Staatz (2003), who estimate a gravity 
model on 2002 data. 
 By contrast, a number of other empirical work confirm a more positive impact of 
AGOA. Nouve (2005) captures spill-over effects of AGOA on SSA aggregate exports 
employs dynamic panel trade model aggregate exports from SSA under AGOA and from 
SSA to the US up to 2004. The estimates suggest that that each dollar increase in AGOA 
exports translates into a 16 to 20 cent spill-over effect on aggregate exports to the US. More 
recently, Didia et al. (2015) perform a cross-country analysis by applying the gravity model 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
estimation technique on aggregated data spanning 12 years. They find a large, positive and 
significant impact caused by the Act, but the promising results wither once the five major 
oil producing nations are not included. The authors conclude that there is a disproportionate 
impact in favour of crude oil exporters, which does not align with the intentions of the Act, 
and suggest that any future research regarding AGOA should be carried out specifically on 
non-energy products to remove distortion (Didia et al., 2015). The disentanglement Didia 
et al. (2015) propose has partly been accomplished in previous work of Tadesse and Fayissa 
(2008). Using the gravity model to assess the impact of AGOA, they undertake a 
comprehensive analysis of manufactured and non-manufactured goods at a 2-digit HTS 
level. The authors state that AGOA had a statistically significant trade initiation effect 
across 24 of the 99 product categories (compared to negative and significant for just 2 
product categories), with the effect on apparel exports being particularly large.  
 
Among all manufactured goods sector, apparel witnessed a particularly sharp rise in 
exports following AGOA implementation. Collier and Venables (2007) find that the 
AGOA apparel provision increased apparel exports to the United States by a factor of 7.4 
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over 1991-2005. They also factor in EU imports in their regression model by considering 
the value of apparel exports from the exporting country to the US relative to its apparel 
exports to the EU as the dependent variable. Using dummy variables, they compare the 
effectiveness of AGOA and EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) initiative on African 
apparel exports. They find that AGOA has a more favourable effect on African apparel 
exports compared to EU’s trade preferences and attribute this to AGOA’s special apparel 
waiver. Portugal-Perez (2008) reports that the more relaxed rules of origin embodied in the 
special provision of AGOA increased exports of apparel by about 300 % for the top seven 
beneficiaries and 96% for the whole sample of 22 countries eligible for the special 
provision. Using a triple difference-in-differences regression as a means to effectively 
isolate AGOA and circumvent issues rising from endogeneity of policy, the dispersed 
impact on apparel products on SSA countries is confirmed by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck 
(2010) who estimate a variation ranging from 9% to 155% rise in exports, with 5 out the 
26 countries being negatively affected. They, however, establish that the impact of the Act 
on apparel trade for the whole sample of countries is substantial and grows significantly 
over time from 21.9% in 2002 to 44.4% in 2006. More recently, using the same 
methodology, Fernandes et.al. (2019) find that AGOA boosted African apparel exports, 
and the expansion of the GSP increased African exports of other eligible products. They 
further note that the marginal impacts on African apparel exports grew sharply in the first 
years of AGOA, but levelled off after the removal of ATC in 2005. 
 
Cook and Jones (2015) looked at less covered aspect of AGOA by evaluating the effects 
of the Act on the extensive margin of trade (i.e the number of distinct products a country 
exports) using the fixed-effects Poisson quasi-maximum-likelihood regression. Their 
empirical results suggest that AGOA stimulates export diversification, especially through 
its apparel provision. Compared to non AGOA-apparel-eligible countries, AGOA-apparel-
eligible countries not only export more apparel products but also more non-apparel 
products to the USA.  
 
While the bulk of the literature has established that AGOA has been beneficial for 
apparel exports from SSA to USA, a less-studied aspect of AGOA has been the indirect 
effect of the agreement on exports to other markets. In other words, is the increase in 
exports to the USA under AGOA a result of a redirection of exports from elsewhere? This 
question was briefly answered by Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) as an addition to 
their main analysis of the impacts of the Act on US imports of various product categories. 
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Due to lack of data on AGOA country exports to the rest of the world, the authors 
considered imports into 25 EU countries instead. Estimates of the triple difference-in-
differences specification were not statistically significant, showing that an increase in 
exports under AGOA did not result in a decrease (or increase) in exports to Europe for 
apparel, agriculture and minerals product categories. On the other hand, EU-25 was found 
to import more of GSP-manufactures products (i.e non-apparel products) from AGOA 
countries, which the authors attributed to spill-over effects such as experience from 
exporting, infrastructure and logistics. Their analysis, however, covered only the years 
1999-2000 and 2002- 2003.  
 
In this paper, we extend Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) analysis by considering 
a longer time span (2001-2016) and focusing solely on the apparel sector and its sub-sectors 
(knitted and non knitted). This sector is of particular interest since it is one of the three9 
non-crude petroleum sectors where US imports under AGOA are concentrated (USITC, 
2014). Indeed, as noted above, previous literature confirms that the bulk of heightened 
exports to the US under AGOA have predominantly been in the textiles and apparel 
industries. Our study adds to Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) in that we examine trade 
redirection four years before and after the removal of the Agreement of Textile and 
Clothing (ATC) as well as in the knitted and non-knitted sub-sectors. Since apparel special 
rule is mostly applicable to the non-knitted sector, our analysis also uncovers whether this 
more relaxed rule of origin would lead to exports displacement in that sector. The 
methodology employed also differs from Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) in that the 
gravity model framework is used.  
 
4. Model Specification and Data Sources 
The Gravity Model 
In line with the literature on trade displacement effects, we use the gravity model as our 
econometric specification. In its basic form, the gravity model posits that trade between 
two countries is positively influenced by economic size, captured by gross domestic 
product of the trading partners, and negatively affected by distance between them.  The 
model is usually augmented with other factors aiding or inhibiting trade.  Work such as 
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff (1995), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and 
Evenett and Keller (2002) have shown that gravity model can be derived from standard 
                                                
9 Excluding crude petroleum (which accounts for around 90% of US imports from AGOA countries), AGOA also 
benefitted transportation equipment (primarily passenger motor vehicles from South Africa) and refined petroleum 
products. 
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trade theories under a range of underlying assumptions, supporting the strong theoretical 
underpinnings of the model. Empirically, the framework has been extensively employed in 
various contexts ranging from assessing trade impacts of regional trading agreements and 
WTO accession to calculation of trade potentials10. Another strand of the gravity literature 
has specifically examined trade displacement effects due to China’s emergence: 
Eichengreen et al. (2004), Greenaway et al. (2008), Amann et al. (2009), Athukorala (2009) 
have looked at Asian countries’ exports displacement due to China’s rise; Giovanetti and 
Sanfilippo (2009) examine China effect on African exports while Giovanetti et. al., (2012) 
consider China effect on EU exports to OECD markets.   
 
For our purpose, we estimate the following gravity specification: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑈𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑓𝑇𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                 (1) 
where  
𝐸𝑈𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗 Imports of each EU-15 country i from each African country j 
𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 US imports from each African country j  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 Real GDP of each EU-15 country i 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 Real GDP of African country j 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 Distance between country i and j 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑗 Product of land areas (km
2) of country i and j 
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗 Number of landlocked countries in pair (0/1/2)  
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 Binary dummy =1 if i ever colonized j, zero otherwise 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 Binary dummy =1 when country i and j share common language, zero 
otherwise 
Polityjt 
AfTjt 
Polity index score of country j 
Aid for trade from official donors to each African country j 
 
 To re-examine Frazer and Van Biesebroeck’s (2010) proposition that the increased 
apparel exports to the US under AGOA could be a result of redirection of exports from 
other markets  (EU-15 in our case), we formulate the following hypotheses for the full and 
sub-samples:  
Hypothesis 1a: 𝛽1 < 0  (Displacement of apparel exports to the EU-15)  
Hypothesis 1b: 𝛽1 > 0 (Complementarity of apparel exports to the EU-15)  
                                                
10 See Greenaway et al., (2008) for related studies 
  14 
 We use bilateral imports of each EU-15 country i from each apparel provision 
eligible African country j as our dependent variable (EUIMPijt). A coefficient on our 
variable of interest, US imports from the same African exporter country j (USIMPj), would 
indicate displacement of EU exports from an increase in exports to US under AGOA.  A 
positive coefficient would imply that exports to the two markets are complementary.  
In its simplest form, the gravity model of trade derived from the Newtonian’s universal 
law of gravity, posits that trade between two countries is positively influenced by their 
economic masses (measured by GDP) and negatively affected by distance between them.  
GDPit in our specification captures importers (EU-15) incomes while GDPjt measures 
exporters (African countries) economic size. On the demand side, a rise in income would 
be conducive to an increase in imports. On the supply side, an increase in exporting 
country’s GDP implies higher output available for exports.  
Since transaction costs increase with distance, one would expect distance (DIST) to 
have a negative impact on bilateral trade. The product of land areas of country pairs (AREA) 
traditionally has a negative relation with the dependent variable as it represents a greater 
amount of production occurring further away from the borders of a country with the aim of 
supplying the domestic market (Greenaway et al. 2008). Landlockedness (Landlocked) 
raises transportation costs in terms of port access, therefore negatively affecting bilateral 
trade. Colonial links (Colony) are expected to increase bilateral trade due to the established 
infrastructure that country j will still benefit from. Sharing a common language (Comlang) 
is another common variable in contemporary gravity models that is known to have a 
positive impact (Greenaway, 2008; Tadesse and Fayissa, 2008; Didia et al. 2015; Didier 
and Hoarau, 2016).  
Polity captures the effect of better institutionalised democracy of country j and is 
expected to have a positive influence on trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) proposed 
that hidden transaction costs such as imperfect contract enforcement have a significant 
impact on the propensity to trade and should therefore be included in the gravity equation. 
This has typically been captured by corruption indices in the literature. We use a broader 
measure of individual exporter’s institutional quality and political stability to capture such 
hidden costs.  
Eichengreen et al. (2004, p.13) note that institutional variables (Polity in our case) have 
the additional benefit of being close substitutes for country fixed effects. Moreover, 
country-pair time-invariant variables such as product of land areas, landlockedness, 
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colonial links and common language, already capture country-pair fixed effects. To avoid 
potential problems of multicollinearity, we do not include fixed effects in our model and 
opt for pooled estimation11.   
Finally, we augment our gravity model with aid for trade (AfT), which has long been an 
integral component of development assistance. Aid for trade, however, rose substantially 
after the initiative was officially launched following the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong. AfT aims at improving supply side capacity and trade related infrastructure 
in developing countries to promote expansion of exports and export composition, 
encourage integration into the multilateral trading system and help them benefit from 
liberalised trade and increased market access (OECD, 2013).  AfT flows comprise three 
key components: AfT for economic infrastructure, AfT for productive capacity building 
and AfT for trade policies and regulations. A number of studies (e.g. Cali and te Velde, 
2011; Helble et al., 2012; Bearce et.al., 2013; Berrittella and Zhang, 2014 and Hühne et al. 
2014) find that AfT is effective in promoting recipients’ exports. We, therefore, include 
total AfT from official donors as a control in our specification. In line with the literature, 
(e.g Bearce et. al., 2013; Cali and te Velde, 2011; Brazys, 2010) we use a two-year lag of 
AfT to account for potential endogeneity of this variable as well as implementation lags. 
 
Descriptive statistics of variables in our specification are presented in Table 1 below. 
Colony and Comlang are binary indicator variables. Increases in Polity imply an increase 
in institutionalized democracy over the sample period and varies by country and over time. 
All other logged variables show reasonable means and variances. It is worth noting that 
there is a lot of missing values for the dependent variable (LnEUIMP) and variable of 
interest (LnUSIMP) as well as aid for trade variables. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
                                                
11 Studies such as Eichengreen et. al. (2004), Greenaway et.al. (2008), Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) on 
displacement effect also use pooled estimation methods. 
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 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 LnEUIMPijt 12495 3.291 4.867 0 19.55 
 LnUSIMPjt 12495 7.421 6.151 0 20.044 
 LnGDPit 12495 27.073 1.144 24.431 28.957 
 LnGDPjt 12015 22.697 1.524 18.59 26.864 
 LnDISTij 12495 3.771 .121 3.375 4.01 
 LnAREAij 12495 10.44 .986 7.178 12.137 
 Landlockedij 12495 .419 .533 0 2 
 Colonyijt 12495 .073 .261 0 1 
 Comlangijt 12495 .133 .34 0 1 
 Polityjt 11475 2.069 5.197 -9 10 
 LnAfTt-2 11025 15.263 6.490 0 21.282 
 
  
 
 The correlation matrix is presented in Table A2 in the appendix. A preliminary 
analysis of the pairwise correlations suggests that they are in general acceptable and show 
no sign of multicollinearity. To deal with zero trade and flows, we follow previous studies 
(e.g Rotunno et.al., 2012; Cali and te Velde, 2011; Bearce et.al, 2013) in adding one before 
taking logs.  
Data Sources  
Bilateral apparel imports of each EU-15 country from each African country are 
sourced from EU trade since 1988, Eurostat and converted to US dollars using exchange 
rate from FRED (2017). Bilateral US imports from Africa are obtained from USITC 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb. US GDP deflator, taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI), is then used to calculate real trade values for both EU-15 
imports and US imports. Real GDP and real GDP per capita data are also from WDI. 
Distance, product of land areas, landlockedness, colonial relationships and common 
language are obtained from CEPII’s GEODist database.  Polity data is sourced from the 
Centre for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV Annual time series. Information on AGOA and 
special waiver country eligibilities (presented in Appendix A) are obtained from 
International Trade Administration (ITA), US Department of Commerce.  Data for AfT 
variables (CRS codes 200 and 30012) are drawn from OECD/DAC Creditor Reporting 
System (CRS) database. We use actual disbursements (following Cali and te Velde, 2011) 
at 2017 constant prices. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
                                                
12 CRS code 300 (AfT for Productive capacity) includes AfT for trade policies and regulations in the OECD/CRS database: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1.  CRS code 200 represent AfT for Economic infrastructure.  
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We first estimate equation (1) using the conventional pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method.  Results are shown in Table 2 below. Column (1) shows the gravity estimates for 
the African countries eligible for the wearing apparel provision over the entire period 2001-
2016. To factor in possible effects of the phasing out of the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC) on Apparel exports, we separately consider four years before the removal 
of the agreement (2001-2004) and four years after its complete phase out (2005-2008). 
Results are reported in columns (2) and (3) respectively. We also examine whether AGOA 
impacts on EU-15 exports differ by type of apparel exported, especially given that AGOA 
offers more lenient rules of origin. The last two columns (4) and (5) show results for Knitted 
Apparel (CH61) and Non-knitted Apparel (CH62) sub-sectors. 
 
Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimates  
Dependent 
Variable: 
 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
Log EU-15 
Imports 
2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Ln USIMPjt 0.291*** 0.154*** 0.172*** 0.149*** 0.156*** 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) 
Ln GDPit 0.832*** 1.208*** 0.963*** 0.690*** 0.587*** 
 (0.127) (0.213) (0.159) (0.134) (0.104) 
Ln GDPjt 1.229*** 1.942*** 1.725*** 1.034*** 1.117*** 
 (0.116) (0.189) (0.169) (0.134) (0.126) 
Ln DISTij 1.243 3.004 0.397 6.387*** -1.621* 
 (1.281) (2.208) (1.726) (1.241) (0.913) 
Ln AREAij -1.285*** -1.714*** -1.354*** -1.001*** -0.448** 
 (0.240) (0.351) (0.286) (0.244) (0.181) 
Landlockedij -1.280*** -0.430 -1.770*** -1.434*** -1.169*** 
 (0.272) (0.478) (0.378) (0.299) (0.210) 
Colonyijt 2.825*** 3.361*** 3.269*** 2.511*** 3.046*** 
 (0.751) (1.190) (0.926) (0.877) (0.757) 
Comlangij 2.091*** 2.434*** 2.299*** 1.907*** 1.566*** 
 (0.458) (0.787) (0.606) (0.497) (0.422) 
Polityjt 0.062* 0.226*** 0.022 0.113*** 0.064*** 
 (0.036) (0.058) (0.048) (0.028) (0.023) 
Ln AfTjt-2 -0.004 0.008 -0.891*** -0.014 0.020 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.205) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant -40.720*** -69.440*** -33.780*** -53.780*** -29.160*** 
 (6.335) (10.110) (8.592) (6.955) (5.423) 
Observations 4,875 795 1,275 5,238 4,834 
R-squared 0.406 0.435 0.448 0.341 0.286 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively  
 
As expected, GDP, and most of the gravity variables are significant and carry the 
expected signs. AfT and distance, however, do not seem to have much impact on African 
apparel exports to EU-15. Our variable of interest USIMPjt is statistically significant and 
shows no evidence of exports displacement. In fact, the positive coefficients point to some 
degree of complementarity between African apparel exports to USA and EU-15.   
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It is possible that our key variable, USIMPjt in equation (1) may not be exogenous. 
An example of correlation between USIMPjt and the error term, also mentioned in 
Eichengreen (2004) and Greenaway et. al. (2008), is an improvement in consumer 
sentiment worldwide. This could increase EU-15’s imports of textiles and clothing from 
Africa as well as US imports from the continent. Endogeneity in this case is mainly due to 
omitted variables rather than two-way causality. Endogeneity of USIMPjt is formally tested 
using the endogeneity test, which hypothesizes that the specified regressor can actually be 
treated as exogenous. A rejection of the null means that the suspect regressor is endogenous 
and OLS is inappropriate. With a test statistic of 19.741 (p=0.000), we are unable to accept 
the null of regressor exogeneity. 
 
The standard solution to the problem of endogeneity in gravity and trade 
displacement literature is to use instrumental variables and the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation method. We choose two external instruments that have been widely used 
in trade displacement literature for the endogenous USIMPjt. These are (i) US GDP 
expressed in natural logarithm and (ii) the distance between US and each African nation, 
also in natural logarithm. It is reasonable to believe that US imports of apparel would be 
commensurate to its GDP. By the same token, the bilateral distance is a key determinant of 
trade between two partners as it is a reflection of transportation costs. To be meaningful, 
instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variable (instrument relevance) and 
uncorrelated with the error term (instrument exogeneity).  
 
Table 3 presents the results from the two-sage least squares estimation. The high 
values of the first-stage F-statistic and statistically non-significant Hansen J statistic 
confirm the relevance and exogeneity of our instruments respectively. As per apriori 
expectations, trading partners’ GDP, colonial links, common language have a positive 
influence on African apparel exports to EU-15 while product of land area and 
landlockedness negatively affect these flows. It is worth recalling that unlike AGOA, EU’s 
preferential schemes are deeply rooted in history, with many EU countries sharing colonial 
ties and common language with African nations. Distance has the correct negative sign as 
highlighted in the gravity literature, but is not statistically significant. Given that African 
exports of apparel to the EU are subject to preferential treatment, distance may not matter 
as such. Better institutions/democracy do not have a statistically significant impact for the 
whole sample (Column 1) but do so in the knitted and non-knitted sub-sectors. This may 
reflect the possibility that aggregation of data may mask certain feature. The two-year 
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lagged AfT is effective in promoting exports as established by previous studies. This result 
does not quite hold in the temporal sub-samples possibly to due the relatively short time 
period (5 years). 
 
Table 3: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates  
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log EU-15 
Imports 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Ln USIMPjt 0.484*** 0.622*** 0.506*** 0.809*** 0.578* 
 (0.050) (0.167) (0.163) (0.162) (0.339) 
Ln GDPit 0.844*** 1.252*** 0.976*** 0.683*** 0.555*** 
 (0.128) (0.233) (0.167) (0.161) (0.116) 
Ln GDPjt 1.048*** 1.700*** 1.362*** 0.177 1.010*** 
 (0.116) (0.208) (0.235) (0.253) (0.155) 
Ln DISTij -0.724 -3.928 -3.717 -1.117 -3.361* 
 (1.394) (3.228) (2.719) (2.340) (1.816) 
Ln AREAij -1.147*** -1.755*** -1.235*** -0.263 -0.110 
 (0.217) (0.346) (0.274) (0.277) (0.292) 
Landlockedij -1.150*** 0.338 -1.469*** -0.911*** -1.103*** 
 (0.267) (0.546) (0.386) (0.336) (0.215) 
Colonyijt 2.912*** 3.362*** 3.477*** 2.672*** 3.110*** 
 (0.698) (1.119) (0.841) (0.842) (0.679) 
Comlangij 2.107*** 2.885*** 2.334*** 2.051*** 1.667*** 
 (0.433) (0.829) (0.555) (0.493) (0.424) 
Polityjt 0.046 -0.051 -0.038 0.188*** 0.069*** 
 (0.034) (0.112) (0.056) (0.044) (0.026) 
Ln AfTjt-2 0.022* -0.013 -0.787*** 0.047** 0.038* 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.210) (0.022) (0.020) 
Constant -33.120*** -42.730*** -16.620 -20.040* -26.240*** 
 (6.812) (14.000) (12.730) (11.770) (6.593) 
Observations 4,875 795 1,275 5,238 4,834 
R-squared 0.358 0.299 0.325 -0.278 -0.043 
1st Stage F-Stat 414.160 47.830 17.060 26.870 3.070 
Hansen J (p-val) 0.1785 0.167 0.474 0.267 0.377 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
        As far as the variable of interest (USIMPjt) is concerned, the positive and statistically 
significant complementary effects of African apparel exports between the USA and EU-15 
are maintained across the (sub)samples. This result not only supports Frazer and Van 
Biesebroeck’s (2010) findings that AGOA did not lead to a decrease in exports to Europe 
but also confirms a complementary effect. Over the entire period (2001-2016), a 1% 
increase in apparel exports to the US led to 0.48% increase in exports to EU-15. When the 
structural change from the removal of quotas on exports of textiles and clothing on 1st 
January 2005 is taken into account, we observe that African nations tend to export slightly 
less to EU-15 after the phase out. In the four years starting January 2005, a 1% rise in 
exports to the US led to only 0.51% increase in exports to EU-15 (column 3) compared to 
a 0.62% increase over the 2001-2004 period (column 2). The complementary effect is also 
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evident in the apparel sub-sectors (columns 4 and 5). A 1% increase in African knitted 
exports to the US led to 0.81 % percentage increase in exports to the EU-15. However, a 
1% increase in non-knitted apparel exports to the US led to a less than proportionate rise 
of 0.58% to EU-15 markets. 
 
Displacement effects: LDCs vs non-LDCs 
Since the majority of LDCs are located in Africa, it would be relevant to examine the 
substitutability or complementarity between imports by EU-15 and the US in LDCs and 
non-LDCs.  LDCs inherently suffer from three major constraints: (i) high levels of poverty 
limiting economic growth; (ii) heavy dependence on commodity, trade and foreign 
exchange; and (iii) weak productive bases and limited export diversification (UNCTAD, 
2016). Despite these high behind the border trade barriers, we still find some evidence of 
complementary apparel exports to the two markets (Table 4). This effect is more apparent 
in the non-knitted sector, suggesting that LDCs may be more reliant on trade preferences. 
Non-LDCs, on the other hand, exhibit patterns similar to our full samples (Full results are 
in Appendix Tables A3 and A4). With comparatively lower trade hindrances, non-LDCs 
are able to diversify both exports and markets. 
 
Table 4: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates: LDCs vs Non-LDCs 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log EU-15 
Imports 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Non-LDCs 0.675*** 0.945*** 0.704*** 0.709*** 0.661*** 
 (0.056) (0.205) (0.125) (0.116) (0.116) 
LDCs 0.299*** -0.101 -0.372 0.218 0.893** 
 (0.058) (0.189) (0.401) (0.353) (0.378) 
      
 
Robustness checks 
It is common practice to include time specific fixed effects in panel regressions. Our 
results so far did not take into consideration potential shocks restricted to a particular year. 
We test the robustness of our results by including these time fixed effects.  The inclusion 
of these dummies, however, resulted in the loss of our instrumental variable (Ln USGDP) 
due to collinearity.  In the presence of one instrument, the equation is exactly identified and 
standard overidentification tests cannot be used (Giovanni and Sanfillippo, 2009). Two 
additional test statistics for under-identification (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) and 
weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic) are, therefore, reported. In the 
presence of heteroskedastic errors, the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistics LM test rejects the null 
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of under-identification. Similarly, the significant Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 
implies a rejection of the null of weak identification. Both suggest that the instrument, 
bilateral distance between US and each African exporter in logarithmic form, is efficient.  
Table 5 presents the results with time dummies.  Our previous findings are maintained 
throughout the (sub)samples.  
Table 5: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates with Time Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  
Log EU-15 Imports 
All Apparel 
2001-2016 
 
All Apparel 
with ATC 
2001-2004 
 
 
All Apparel 
without ATC 
2005-2008 
 
Knitted 
CH61    
2001-2016 
 
 
2001-2016 
 
Non-
Knitted 
CH62       
2001-2016 
 
 
Ln USIMPjt 0.626*** 0.681*** 0.541*** 1.275*** 0.579* 
 (0.149) (0.178) (0.178) (0.291) (0.362) 
Ln GDPit 0.818*** 1.258*** 0.973*** 0.658*** 0.562*** 
 (0.133) (0.239) (0.170) (0.222) (0.115) 
Ln GDPjt 1.069*** 1.679*** 1.308*** -0.528 0.889*** 
 (0.194) (0.213) (0.254) ( .463) (0.217) 
Ln DISTij -2.581 -4.852 -4.045 -6.042 -3.044* 
 (2.007) (3.359) (2.858) (3.856) (1.692) 
Ln AREAij -0.955*** -1.768*** -1.220*** 0.354 -0.155 
 (0.217) (0.352) (0.279) (0.455) (0.282) 
Landlockedij -1.260*** 0.424 -1.456*** -0.616 -1.036*** 
 (0.284) (0.564) (0.390) (0.503) (0.225) 
Colonyijt 2.999*** 3.359*** 3.503*** 2.763*** 3.142*** 
 (0.672) (1.120) (0.841) (1.057) (0.683) 
Comlangij 2.052*** 2.942*** 2.335*** 2.172*** 1.653*** 
 (0.428) (0.843) (0.558) (0.693) (0.418) 
Polityjt 0.001 -0.095 -0.044 0.246*** 0.063** 
 (0.039) (0.117) (0.058) (0.068) (0.026) 
Ln AfTjt-2 -0.547*** -0.213 -0.762*** 0.068 0.315 
 (0.129) (0.288) (0.211) (0.241) (0.212) 
Constant -16.970 -35.690** -14.36 4.734 -28.980*** 
 (11.440) (14.820) (13.670) (18.960) (6.041) 
Observations 4,875 795 1,275 5,238 4,834 
R-squared 0.283 0.266 0.305 -0.407 -0.034 
Time dummies 
included 
yes yes yes yes yes 
K-P rK LM stat  
     p- value 
K-P rK Wald 
stat  
     p-value 
26.143 39.267 19.623 13.848 3.319 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.069 
K-P Wald k F stat  
 
38.371 89.252 25.995 17.121 3.470 
p-value 
 
statistic 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    *, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
To address the issue of variable endogeneity whilst ensuring tests for over-identifying 
restrictions apply, we additionally employ the two-step system generalised methods of 
moments (GMM).  This method allows instruments to be selected from within the model. 
The validity of moments conditions can be ascertained using statistical tests proposed by 
Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982), which are not applicable when the two-stage least 
squares equation is exactly identified. As before, we treat the variable of interest, USIMPjt 
as endogenous. In most regressions, the high value of the Hansen statistic confirms 
instrument validity. Moreover the “rule-of-thumb” proposed by Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
which states that in every regression the instrument count should be less than the number 
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of groups within the sample is also satisfied in the main samples, indicating that our model 
does not suffer from the “too many instruments” problem. It is worth noting, however, that 
due to small time span and missing values, GMM estimations may not be reliable for some 
subsamples. The GMM results are reported Table A5 in the appendix. The signs and 
significance of variables are consistent with the two stage least squares estimates. Overall, 
albeit differences in coefficient magnitudes, results confirm the complementary effect of 
African apparel exports to the US and EU-15 in the full samples. Due to the short span of 
time pre- and post ATC, appropriate caveats apply to the GMM estimates. 
Discussion 
Our results suggest that a complementarity in apparels exports from Africa to US 
and EU-15 over the 2001-2016 span. Following AGOA’s implementation in 2000, apparel 
exports from the region to the US increased rapidly until expiry of ATC in 2005. Although 
a number of countries were AGOA-eligible, over 95% of the apparel exports to the US 
were accounted for by a handful of countries, namely Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa (Gillson et.al, 2007). Investors from quota-
constrained suppliers, in particular China and Taiwan, set up factories in some of these 
countries especially those benefitting from the “third country fabric provision” and used 
them as backdoors to access US market duty free and quota-free. With the phase out of 
ATC, many Asian firms closed the apparel facilities, leading to a sharp drop in apparel 
exports to the US in the first few years following its expiry.  Against this backdrop, it is 
not surprising to find that AGOA did not have any crowding out effect on apparel exports 
to EU-15, which remained fairly steady since 2000. The weaker complementary effect post 
ATC termination suggests that less competitive African suppliers took more advantage of 
AGOA and exported more to the US as opposed to EU-15 in face of mounting competition 
from South and East Asian apparel exporters that obtained new quota-free access to the 
developed country markets.  
 
This is also evident over the longer time span in the apparel subsectors. Since EU’s 
rules of origin do not grant producers in African LDCs the freedom to source fabrics from 
anywhere in the world as is possible under AGOA, one would expect AGOA’s special rule 
beneficiaries to redirect their non-knitted apparel exports to the US at the expense of EU-
15. We find evidence of a preference for the US market in this sub-sector but there is no 
export crowding out. Not surprisingly, African countries tend to favour EU-15 market for 
their knitted apparel exports, to which EU’s more restrictive rules do not apply. 
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It is worth noting that although a number of African countries are eligible for the 
Apparel provision, apparel exports originate from only a handful of countries, in particular 
Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Swaziland and South Africa. Despite the duty-
free privilege, other nations have not been successful in expanding their apparel exports 
due to higher transportation costs to the US relative to EU-15.  African apparel also 
competes head to head against exports to US neighbours who equally benefit from duty-
free access under trade arrangements. African nations are further disadvantaged by poor 
infrastructure, cumbersome customs procedures and dearth of technical and managerial 
talent. Uncertainty surrounding AGOA and its apparel provision renewals has also 
prompted African apparel exporters to retain their more secure EU markets.  Despite the 
restrictive rules of origins under EU’s EBA program, African apparel producers still stand 
to benefit from the more liberal cumulation allowances offered by EU’s Cotonou 
Agreement, allowing African apparel exporters to source their fabrics from the region and 
meet the demands of EU markets.  
 
Overall, despite its efforts to improve beneficiaries’ economic and institutional 
structure and more liberal rules of origin, it can be argued that AGOA did not have the 
ability to substantially attract exports away from the other major market. A number of 
reasons could explain this. First, the higher transportation costs resulting from distance and 
lack of efficient trade linkages to the US market relative to EU-15 is a key barrier that many 
African nations struggle to overcome (USITC, 2014). Second, the margin of preference 
enjoyed by African nations under AGOA is shrinking as more countries supply the US 
under other trade agreements such as Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which account for a larger share of 
the US apparel market under preference, dwarfing by far African countries’ share under 
AGOA (Naumann, 2012).  Third, concerns have been expressed over the short term and 
last minute renewals of the third country fabric provision. Before its latest new lease of life 
in 2015, the provision was renewed for periods of only three to five years, which are 
deemed as not certain enough to place new orders or undertake new investments (USITC, 
2014). Investment decisions can also be influenced by the revocation of AGOA status if 
eligibility criteria are not met. With a high likelihood that some fragile African states may 
not meet these criteria, they are likely to revert to weak governance, hence forestalling 
potential investments that would only be profitable with free market access.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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This paper extends the literature by examining potential displacement effect of apparel 
exports to the EU as a result of increased exports under AGOA over the period 2001-2016 
using the gravity model. We use the two-stage least squares to address the problem of 
endogeneity of the variable of interest. Empirical results show no evidence of displacement 
but instead reveal a complementary effect between exports to the two markets. This 
positive effect still holds in the Non-Knitted (CH62) apparel sector despite a more relaxed 
rule of origin offered under AGOA compared to EU’s EBA and Cotonou Agreement. 
However, for every percentage increase in exports of Non-Knitted apparel to the US, there 
is a less than proportionate increase to EU-15, suggesting that the special waiver under 
AGOA remains attractive to African apparel exporters. Not surprisingly, EU-15 markets 
attract more Knitted apparel from Africa than does the US. Our main finding of 
complementarity from the two-stage least squares are confirmed by the dynamic two-step 
GMM estimates although coefficients are smaller in magnitude. We also find some 
evidence of complementary apparel exports to both LDCs and non-LDCs with stronger 
effects for non-LDCs and in non-knitted sector.  
 
Future work could consider the longer life span of AGOA following its latest renewal 
in 2015. This would allow one to also capture the on-going changes in EU trade 
arrangements in particular implementation of Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs). 
This new agreement comes with more flexible rules of origin requiring single 
transformation instead of the double step. As most African nations are still in the process 
of adopting EPAs, new research can shed more light on complementary or displacement 
effects once these agreements are adopted. 
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Appendix: Table A1: African Countries’ Eligibility for AGOA, Apparel Provision and Special Rule, 
2001-2016 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Angola         ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Benin ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Botswana ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Burkina Faso           ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Burundi           ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cameroon ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Cape Verde ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Central Af Rep ✓ ✓ ✓                         ✓ 
Chad ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Comoros               ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Congo Dem R     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓             
Congo Rep ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Cote d'Ivoire   ✓ ✓A S ✓A S             ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Djibouti ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Eq. Guinea                                 
Eritrea ✓ ✓ ✓                           
Ethiopia ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Gabon  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Gambia     ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S     
Ghana ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Guinea ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Guinea Bissau ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Kenya ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Lesotho ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Liberia             ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Madagascar ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S         ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Malawi ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Mali ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mauritania ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mauritius ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Mozambique ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Namibia ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Niger ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S   ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Nigeria ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Rwanda ✓A  ✓A  ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Sao Tome ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Senegal ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Seychelles ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Sierra Leone ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Somalia                                 
South Africa ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  ✓A  
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South Sudan                         ✓ ✓     
Sudan                                 
Swaziland ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S     
Tanzania ✓ ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Togo               ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Uganda ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Zambia ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S ✓A S 
Zimbabwe                                 
Source: United States International Trade Commission, (2014). Updated using information from USITC 
Dataweb and AGOA.info (https://agoa.info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html) 
Key: ✓: Eligible for AGOA; A Eligible for Apparel Provision;  S Eligible for Special Rule  
EU-15 Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa in 2015 (as per UNCTAD, 2016): Angola, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
  
   
 
   
 
Appendix: Table A2- Correlation Matrix 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10) 
 (1) LnUSIMPijt 1.000 
 (2) LnGDPit 0.002 1.000 
 (3) LnGDPjt 0.112 0.009 1.000 
 (4) LnDISTij 0.364 -0.028 0.112 1.000 
 (5) LnAREAij -0.166 0.097 0.529 -0.123 1.000 
 (6) Landlockedij 0.055 -0.213 -0.044 0.147 0.062 1.000 
 (7) Colonyij -0.002 0.066 0.015 -0.007 0.076 -0.069 1.000 
 (8) Comlangij 0.030 -0.037 0.015 0.047 -0.077 -0.078 0.580 1.000 
 (9) Polityjt 0.144 0.001 0.158 0.200 -0.008 -0.130 0.019 0.006 1.000 
 (10) LnAfTjt-2 -0.061 0.021 0.242 -0.026 0.135 0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.058 1.000 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
Appendix: Table A3- Least Developed Countries (LDCs)-Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log EU-15 
Imports 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Ln USIMPjt 0.299*** -0.101 -0.372 0.218 0.893** 
 (0.058) (0.189) (0.401) (0.353) (0.378) 
Ln GDPit 0.616*** 0.934*** 0.610** 0.509*** 0.405*** 
 (0.133) (0.228) (0.243) (0.157) (0.153) 
Ln GDPjt 1.055*** 0.150 0.279 0.474 2.056*** 
 (0.209) (0.516) (1.243) (0.353) (0.522) 
Ln DISTij -3.470** -5.078 3.332 4.237* -1.687 
 (1.367) (3.550) (6.159) (2.181) (1.266) 
Ln AREAij -0.0639 0.480 -0.287 0.228 -0.005 
 (0.256) (0.456) (0.577) (0.251) (0.254) 
Landlockedij -0.653** -0.429 -0.842 -1.303*** -1.209*** 
 (0.299) (0.610) (0.650) (0.375) (0.352) 
Colonyijt 2.727*** 2.686 2.851 2.521** 3.403*** 
 (0.878) (1.818) (2.087) (1.085) (0.886) 
Comlangij 2.218*** 1.964** 2.194* 1.592*** 1.589*** 
 (0.440) (0.877) (1.280) (0.489) (0.594) 
Polityjt 0.068* 0.207* 0.115 0.020 0.013 
 (0.038) (0.107) (0.096) (0.033) (0.041) 
Ln AfTjt-2 0.042*** 0.043** 0.265 0.021 -0.006 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.675) (0.014) (0.022) 
Constant -27.530*** -11.780 -31.350* -41.930*** -54.290*** 
 (6.816) (15.670) (16.320) (12.450) (13.530) 
Observations 2,820 420 735 3,130 3,161 
R-squared 0.256 0.179 -0.326 0.202 -0.659 
1st Stage F-Stat 131.798 11.134 3.104 3.549 4.578 
Hansen J (p-val) 0.004 0.239 0.043 0.038 0.761 
      
 
Appendix: Table A4- Non-Least Developed Countries (Non-LDCs)-Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Log EU Imports 
(1) 
All Apparel 
(2) 
All Apparel 
With ATC 
(3) 
All Apparel 
Without ATC 
(4) 
Knitted 
(CH61) 
(5) 
Non-Knitted 
(CH62) 
 2001-2016 2001-2004 2005-2008 2001-2016 2001-2016 
Ln USIMPjt 0.675*** 0.945*** 0.704*** 0.709*** 0.661*** 
 (0.0598) (0.205) (0.125) (0.116) (0.116) 
Ln GDPit 1.128*** 1.717*** 1.403*** 0.743*** 0.708*** 
 (0.227) (0.382) (0.302) (0.242) (0.212) 
Ln GDPjt 0.724*** 1.253*** 1.100*** 0.311 0.455* 
 (0.180) (0.310) (0.258) (0.262) (0.260) 
Ln DISTij 2.911 0.979 -3.521 1.686 -6.636** 
 (2.592) (4.545) (4.333) (3.388) (3.151) 
Ln AREAij -1.711*** -2.614*** -1.457*** -0.756** -0.235 
 (0.261) (0.430) (0.428) (0.327) (0.324) 
Landlockedij -1.101** 2.076** -2.071*** -2.077*** -2.050*** 
 (0.518) (0.989) (0.788) (0.549) (0.546) 
Colonyijt 2.988*** 3.735** 2.928*** 2.170* 2.984*** 
 (1.015) (1.502) (1.104) (1.257) (1.128) 
Comlangij 1.847*** 3.332*** 2.052*** 2.443*** 1.893** 
 (0.612) (1.197) (0.747) (0.690) (0.831) 
Polityjt -0.0476 -0.416*** -0.016 0.270*** 0.119*** 
 (0.062) (0.143) (0.087) (0.053) (0.041) 
  35 
Ln AfTjt-2 0.036* -0.075** -1.245*** 0.046* 0.059* 
 (0.021) (0.031) (0.335) (0.028) (0.034) 
Constant -42.490*** -56.440*** -14.670 -29.840* -4.900 
 (13.120) (20.310) (22.290) (16.960) (14.140) 
Observations 2,055 375 540 2,108 1,673 
R-squared 0.356 0.311 0.256 0.037 -0.220 
1st Stage F-Stat 404.080       63.014       117.534       97.218       63.416   
Hansen J (p-val) 0.144        0.147        0.267       0.003        0.134 
      
 
Appendix: Table A5- Dynamic Two-step GMM Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable:  
Log EU Imports 
All Apparel 
2001-2016 
 
 
 
All Apparel 
with ATC 
2001-2004 
 
 
All Apparel 
without ATC 
2005-2008 
 
Knitted 
CH61    
2001-2016 
 
 
2001-2016 
 
Non-Knitted 
CH62         
2001-2016 
 
 
Ln EUIMPijt-1 0.178*** 0.288*** 0.225*** 0.264*** 0.825*** 
 (0.041) (0.073) (0.049) (0.042) (0.050) 
Ln USIMPjt 0.198*** 0.060 0.015 0.084*** 0.038** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) 
Ln GDPit 0.710*** 0.775*** 0.778*** 0.494*** 0.114*** 
 (0.135) (0.197) (0.159) ( .1 ) (0.044) 
Ln GDPjt 0.944*** 1.465*** 1.280*** 0.643*** 0.195*** 
 (0.151) (0.205) (0.179) (0.135) (0.072) 
Ln DISTij 1.445 2.712 2.600* 3.588*** 0.056 
 (1.266) (2.156) (1.498) (1.078) (0.316) 
Ln AREAij -0.935*** -1.313*** -1.305*** -0.759*** -0.030 
 (0.254) (0.354) (0.339) (0.221) (0.058) 
Landlockedij -0.858*** -0.447 -1.229*** -0.894*** -0.207** 
 (0.296) (0.452) (0.384) (0.255) (0.095) 
Colonyijt 2.680*** 2.329** 2.704*** 2.743*** 0.495 
 (0.823) (0.970) (0.988) (0.865) (0.329) 
Comlangij 1.834*** 2.120** 1.796** 1.411** 0.314** 
 (0.571) (0.844) (0.758) (0.560) (0.151) 
Polityjt 0.057* 0.179*** 0.083* 0.068*** 0.010 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.044) (0.025) (0.009) 
Ln AfTjt-2 0.135 -0.099 -0.021 0.339*** 0.089 
 (0.181) (0.527) (0.220) (0.127) (0.072) 
Constant -40.950*** 0 -42.690*** -41.810*** -8.949*** 
 (6.827) (0) (8.322) (7.170) (2.590) 
Observations 5,025 945 1,275 5,488 5,034 
AR(1) Arellano Bond (p value) 
 PValue  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(1) Arellano Bond (p value) 
valPValue  
 
0.202 0.139 0.419 0.014 0.159 
Hansen (p value) 0.276 - 0.000 0.329 0.242 
No. of Instruments 80 26 46 136 192 
No .of Country pairs 375 300 330 420 405 
Time dummies included 
 
statistic 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Robust standard errors are computed having applied Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.  
*, **, *** indicate insignificance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
